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I. Introduction 
Discussions of that venerable institution-the corporate board of 
directors-are moving from the financial pages and the learned journals to 
the front pages and the nightly TV news. It is becoming apparent that during 
a period of dramatic takeover battles the role of the board can be crucial. 
A prestigious group of heads of major U.S. companies, the Business Round-
table, states that, in responding to hostile takeovers, first consideration should 
be given to three factors-the fundamental values of the free market, the rights 
of shareholders, and "the judgment of corporate boards of directors:' On the 
positive side, the Roundtable endorses mergers and acquisitions approved by 
boards of directors of acquired companies. In contrast, it criticizes corporate 
raiders proceeding "without appropriate involvement of directors ... " 1 The 
Roundtable is referring to acquisitions that are made by buying large amounts 
of the company's stock directly from existing shareholders. 
On the legislative front, Senator John H. Chafee of Rhode Island has intro-
duced a bill to regulate takeovers which provides a special role for the boards 
of directors of both the bidding and the target companies. In the case of the 
bidders, a majority of their outside directors would have to approve takeover 
attempts when the value of the transaction amounts to less than 20 percent 
of the target company's net book value. Above 20 percent, the effort would 
require shareholder approval. For the target company, majority approval by 
outside disinterested directors would be needed on any tender offer for over 
20 percent of the company's outstanding shares. 
Senator Chafee maintains that only the disinterested directors can be counted 
on "to do what's best for the long term interests of the corporation:' He notes 
that the decisions of the target managements become "solely self-serving" when 
hostile takeover efforts threaten their personal positions. He downplays the 
role of the shareholders because "arbitrageurs acquire large blocks, if not con-
trol, of a target almost immediately upon, if not before, the announcement 
of a takeover. m 
Meanwhile, some individual companies have enacted anti-takeover provi-
sions which put the board of directors squarely in the middle of these merger 
and acquisition battles. In the case of Household International, the directors 
adopted such a "poison pill" to discourage unwanted takeovers. The "pill" 
is in the form of new rights to shareholders to acquire, at a marked discount, 
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a large equity stake in any successful suitor whose offer has not been approved 
by the company's board. This provision is being contested in the courts on the 
grounds that "poison pills" effectively usurp the voting rights of the 
stockholders. 
Simultaneously with these efforts to expand the role of corporate directors, 
criticism of the board has become pervasive. One retired board chairman of 
a successful company describes the board of directors as the Achilles heel of 
the American corporation. 3 A leading scholar refers to the corporate board 
as an impotent legal fiction. 4 "Rubber stamp" seems the kindest description 
that critics offer. 
The new burst of public attention to the corporate board, from friend and 
foe alike, is matched by widespread ignorance-both of how that important 
economic institution functions and how it has been changing on its own in 
recent years. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that many have pro-
posed that government regulate more closely the activities of corporate boards. 
Given the private nature of the workings of this institution, most people-
including many of those who write on the subject and recommend major 
changes-have never attended a board meeting and seen the institution in 
operation. 
Thus, it is appropriate to examine in detail the evolving role of boards of 
directors, with special attention to strengthening the board at a time when it 
often is the focal point of corporate responses to external threats. This report 
focuses on the boards of larger publicly held corporations in the United States. 
Although the author presents his own viewpoint, developed in part from his 
service as a corporate director, most of the material in this report is a distil-
lation of a great many specialized studies in law, economics, and business ad-
ministration. The intent here is to provide an up-to-date synthesis and some 
findings and proposals to guide the development of a constructive response 
to the pressures increasingly felt in the boardroom, particularly unsolicited 
takeover efforts. 
Section II of this report examines the different views of what corporate 
boards of directors can and should do. Section III presents many of the specific 
criticisms of the institution, while Section IV analyzes voluntary changes in 
the functioning of boards of directors. Section V examines a variety of pro-
posals for improving the performance in the boardroom. The report ends with 
specific recommendations to enhance the board's ability to respond to exter-
nal challenges. 
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1. "Free Market, Shareholder Rights, Directors' Judgment Are Key to 
Takeover Solution:' Roundtable Report, April 1985, pp. 3-4. 
2. Statement by Senator John H. Chafee in the United States Senate Introduc-
ing the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1985 and Amendments to the Internal 
Revenue Code, March 7, 1985, pp. 3-4. 
3. Kenneth N. Dayton, "Corporate Governance: The Other Side of the Coin:' 
Harvard Business Review, January/February 1984, p. 34. 
4. Peter Drucker, "The Bored Board:' Wharton Magazine, Fall 1976, p. 19. 
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II. What a Director Does: 
The Gap Between Expectation and Reality 
In examining the changing role of the corporate director, let us begin with 
first principles. According to Richard Eells, director of Columbia University's 
program of studies of the modern corporation, "The board of directors of the 
modern corporation is the helm from which one of the major institutions of 
our society is guided. " 1From a more formal viewpoint, corporate boards ex-
ist to meet the legal requirements imposed by the state chartering authorities; 
a board of directors of three or more individuals must be constituted to direct 
the affairs of the corporation. The Model Business Corporation Act sets forth 
the basic legal role of the board of directors of a corporation in less majestic 
terms than Eells, but in equally powerful legal phraseology: 
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under authority of, ~nd ~he 
business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the directiOn 
of, a board of directors ... 2 
Prior to 1974, the Model Act stated that "the business and affairs of the 
corporation shall be managed by a board of directors~' The change reflects 
the rising importance of part-time outside directors who delegate the conduct 
of the corporation to full-time management. In earlier years, senior corporate 
members comprised the typical board. 
A. The Formal Role 
The legal statement of the board's authority, incorporated in the statutes 
of more than 25 states, is so vague and sweeping as to provide little guidance 
as to what a board of directors really does in practice. The Section on Cor-
poration, Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association has 
attempted to flesh out that role by focusing on the board's primary function: 
The fundamental responsibility of the individual corporate director is to 
represent the interests of the shareholders as a .group, as the ow~ers o~ t~e 
enterprise, in dealing with the business and affairs of the corporatiOn withm 
the law.3 
In its modern form, the typical board does not manage, but is expected to 
provide oversight over the professional management of its company. State law, 
for example, typically provides that merger agreements must be approved by 
the directors. Added detail on the board's role was provided in an important 
statement on corporate governance adopted by a conference of the American 
Assembly in 1978. The group consisted of 68 distinguished leaders from many 
walks of life. They concluded that boards of directors have five primary 
functions: 
• Appraising management performance and providing for management and 
board succession; 
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• Determining significant policies and actions with respect to present and 
future profitability and the strategic direction of the enterprise; 
• Determining policies and actions with a potential for significant finan-
cial, economic, and social impact; 
• Establishing policies and procedures designed to obtain compliance with 
the law; and 
• Monitoring the totality of corporate performance. 
The Assembly also stated that boards have a primary role in interpreting 
for management society's expectations and standards. 4 The totality of board 
power envisioned by the American Assembly is impressive. In contrast, Peter 
Drucker sees the board's role in more passive terms. He contends that there 
are six essential corporate needs which only an effective board can fill: 
• Asking crucial questions; 
• Acting as a conscience, a keeper of human and moral values; 
• Giving advice and counsel to top management; 
• Serving as a window on the outside world; 
• Helping the corporation be understood by its constituencies and by the 
outside community; and 
• Assuring management competence. 5 
If the American Assembly approach puts the center of gravity of the cor-
poration in the boardroom, Drucker implicitly sees it elsewhere, presumably 
in the top management. Nevertheless, his view of a properly functioning board 
is that of an active and important mechanism. James G. Lagges, a vice presi-
dent of A. T. Kearney, the management consulting firm, is even more explicit 
on that score. He describes the desirable role of corporate directors as follows: 
The proper function of directors is to act as an adjunct of management, 
to protect owner interests and to serve in a quasi-auditing capacity. In fulfill-
ing these roles, they should determine policy, establish and approve strategy, 
evaluate performance, and perform similar high-level actions. 6 
George A. Steiner, professor of management at the UCLA Graduate School 
of Management, extends that approach in describing the board's "core" 
functions: 
• Providing for management succession; 
• Considering decisions and actions having major economic impacts; 
• Considering major social and political effects; and 
• Establishing policies and procedures for compliance with the law. 
Cutting across these functions, in Steiner's view, is the need to make certain 
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that there is an appropriate flow of information to the board and that inter-
nal policies and procedures of the company are fully capable of responding 
to board decisions. 7 
Each of the writings cited-and they are representative-provides an im-
pressive array of duties and responsibilities for the corporate director. At least, 
this is the theory. What is the practice? 
B. Actual Practice 
Views on the actual role of the board vary substantially. Most analyses show 
that the operations of many corporate boards fall short of the standard expec-
tation. A considerable literature exists which provides an unflattering evalua-
tion of how corporate boards actually function. For example, Courtney C. 
Brown, retired dean of the Columbia University Business School and board 
member of several leading corporations, provides this negative view: 
The role of the governing board remains one of ambiguity, uncertainty, 
and doubt ... Without considerable clarification and strengthening of their 
roles, members of governing boards cannot be reasonably expected to fulfill, 
to the extent of their capabilities, their inherent opportunities to contribute 
to the healthy future development of a corporation. 8 
Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg has noted that "the 
board is relegated to an advisory and legitimizing function that is substantially 
different from the role of policymaker and guardian of shareholder and public 
interests contemplated by the law of corporations. " 9 
Harold S. Geneen, retired CEO of ITT, has restated Brown's position, with 
greater vehemence (although he was a notoriously imperious chief executive): 
Among the boards of directors of Fortune 500 companies, I estimate that 
950Jo are not fully doing what they are legally, morally, and ethically sup-
posed to do. And they couldn't, even if they wanted to. 
... The board's primary function is to oversee and evaluate the perfor-
mance of management ... if that performance is not satisfactory, to do 
something about it ... That is what is supposed to happen ... But it doesn't. 10 
The retired chairman wrote that, every time you find a business 
is in trouble, "you find that the board is unwilling or unable 
to carry out its responsibilities.•• 
In 1984, Kenneth W. Dayton, the retired chairman of the Dayton-Hudson 
Corporation, wrote that, every time a business is in trouble, "you find that 
the board is unwilling or unable to carry out its responsibilities. "" 
Can we reconcile the Brown-Geneen-Dayton "do-nothing" role of corporate 
directors with the standard or more formal approach? For one thing, we need 
to realize that in any human institution the actual performance of activities 
varies over time, circumstance, and with the individuals involved. In any event, 
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we can obtain an intermediate view of this important part of the corporate 
governance process by examining surveys of what corporate managers 
themselves believe. 
As we might suspect, the typical company executive does not view the board 
as t~e key decision-maker in the organization. He sees it as exercising a useful, 
albeit more modest, function. In his pioneering study of leadership practices 
in large companies in the 1930s and 1940s, R. A. Gordon noted that individual 
board members often act as trusted counselors of the CEO and frequently are 
able to exert a strong influence. 12 Four decades later this finding still holds. 
According to a survey in the early 1980s of the managements of 600 pub-
licly held companies, the most important function of the board is to counsel 
the senior executives. In management's view, the next highest ranking duties 
of the board are assuring the integrity of the company's operations, assuring 
a strategic plan for the future, and monitoring the performance of the chief 
executive officer (CEO). Less than two-fifths ranked responsibility for manage-
ment succession as a high priority (see Table 1, p. 10). 
It is interesting to note that the directors' own view of their responsibilities 
does not differ significantly from the way that management sees them. A 1981 
study of individual board members reported that "assuring the integrity of 
the company's operations" was viewed as the primary responsibility of the 
board. (Both of these studies were performed by the auditing firm of Arthur 
Young.) 13 These studies also attempted to gauge the actual influence of boards 
of directors on company decision-making. More than two-thirds of the 
correspondents reported "compensation of the management as a key area of 
influence." Less than one-fourth listed "long-range planning" or "capital 
expenditures" in that category!4 
C The Board's Ultimate Power 
There are other, less measurable aspects of the potential contribution of cor-
porate directors. The presence of a board of directors helps to assure the out-
side world that the organization is in good hands. Company spokesmen can 
point to the distinguished list of board members. And, perhaps most impor-
tant, boards also provide a standby facility for emergency use in times of crisis!5 
There are other examples of the important potential authority of the board. 
"Bottom line control" describes the latent but critical power of the board to 
Ultimately the board has "bottom line control,- the latent but 
critical power to remove the management. 
remove the management!6 Myles Mace, in his classic study of the corporate 
board, concludes that this power is rarely used, "only when results deteriorate 
to an almost fatal point. " 17 However, one study found at least 16 and possibly 
as many as 26 firings of CEOs among the 300 largest U.S. corporations in 1965!8 
On the positive side, Mace reported that, when the board does remove the 
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CEO, the directors usually were "impressive" in their ability and willingness 
to assume the top corporate responsibilities!9 
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the board's power over a corpora-
tion's management is how differently the CEO and other senior officers would 
perform their tasks if they did not periodically have to go to the board to obtain 
approvals. Thus, a process that, on the surface seems to be a perfunctory ritual, 
may turn out to be influential after all. However, this aspect of boardroom 
activity is least subject to formal evaluation. 
Thus, in those situations where a board approves a proposed project, but 
only after members raise some embarrassing questions about the details, a feed-
back effect is often set in motion. The next round of submissions which are 
being prepared for consideration by the board will be more carefully developed 
by management. In practice, many CEOs also "try out" major proposals on 
key board members prior to formal meetings. Similarly, directors often express 
serious concerns to the CEO outside of the boardroom. 20 Thus, the overall 
impact of the board may be far greater than can be inferred from specific deci-
sions on the items on its formal agenda. 
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Table 1 
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD 
Percentage of Companies Ranking Each 
Item as First, Second, or Third Priority 
Manu- Nonmanu- Financial 
Responsibility facturing facturing Services 
Group Group Group 
Counsel Top Management 650Jo 70% 59% 
Assure the Integrity of 
54 51 the Company's Operations 52 
Assure a Strategic Plan 
51 49 for the Future 51 
Monitor the Performance 
42 54 of the CEO 51 
Assure Management Succession 38 36 39 
Monitor Financial Reporting 18 21 17 
Serve the Public Interest 12 10 13 
Represent the Board as Required 5 6 3 
Assure Compliance with 
1 5 Government Regulations 1 
Monitor Product Integrity 0 1 0 
Source: Edwin s. Mruk and James A. Giardina, Organization and Compen-
sation of Boards of Directors (New York: Arthur Young, 1983). 
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Ill. Criticisms of the Board 
Three major and interrelated criticisms have been leveled at the institution 
of the corporate board of directors. 
A. "The Board Is a Rubber Stamp" 
The most frequent criticism of the corporate board of directors is that it is 
ceremonial, that it rubber-stamps the views of management. 
This belief comes from many sources and has been widely held for a con-
siderable period of time. In his study of large companies four decades ago, 
Gordon concluded that directors are closer to top management than to the 
stockholders and that ratification of management proposals by the board is 
largely a formality. • He also reported that, as a result of its control of the proxy 
machinery, it is more common for management to select directors than 
vice versa. 2 
The most frequent criticism of the corporate board of directors 
is that it is ceremonial, that it rubber-stamps the views of management. 
Mace, in his authoritative study of corporate boards in the late 1960s, 
reported that the role of directors is largely advisory and not of a decision-
making nature. He quotes one company president as saying, "The board of 
directors serves as a sounding board ... The decision is not made by the 
board ... " 3 
An account of the bankruptcy of the Penn Central reached an even stronger 
conclusion: 
Penn Central's directors seem to have done very little to earn the $200 each 
received each time they attended a board meeting ... With few exceptions, 
they appeared to be blind to the on-rushing events that sent the Penn Central 
hurtling off the tracks. 4 
Frederick D. Sturdivant concludes that most research lends credence to the 
critics' notion that the board of directors is a weak, ineffectual body in pro-
viding accountability for corporate actions. In this view, the corporate board 
is seen as a cozy group of insiders-"members of top management, an attorney 
from the corporation's outside law firm, the president from the company's 
bank, and a few of the chief executive officer's personal friends. " 5 
According to the general counsel of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., " ... the 
managers of the business, the supposed servants of the shareholders, effec-
tively became their own supervisors and the control ostensibly exercised by the 
board of directors became wholly formal. " 6 Drucker makes a similar point. 
He states that board meetings rarely go beyond such trivia as approval of pro-
motions which already have become accomplished fact; review of last month's 
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operating results when they have become history; and spirited debates over a 
branch manager's right to sign checks. 7 
Surely, Gordon's conclusion on the basis of corporate practice in the 1930s 
still rings true in the 1980s: "It is no secret that the board's actual role in most 
large corporations is far different from the conventionalized picture. " 8 
On the other hand, too much may be expected of the board. There is a parallel 
between the relationship of the board and the top management described here 
and the similar relationship of the senior executives and the operating divi-
sions. Thomas A. Murphy, retired CEO of General Motors, explained why the 
top ranking executives do not necessarily believe that they are at the center of 
power. He described the company's management processes as almost dictating 
important decisions before they arrive for formal approval of the central 
management. He viewed GM as being nearly as self-governing as a Cadillac 
on cruise control. 9 
Well-functioning boards are not newsworthy. Only those that 
malfunction are uinteresting,, topics for discussion. 
In evaluating the various criticisms of the corporate board, we should be 
mindful of the fact that well-functioning boards are not newsworthy. Only those 
that malfunction are "interesting" topics for discussion. Given the numerous 
success stories in American industry and commerce over the years, it is likely 
that corporate boards of directors often do make a useful contribution, even 
if it is merely to support a talented and effective management. After all, a board 
that is happy with the way that the CEO and his associates are running the 
company is likely to perform its role in a quiet and low-key manner. 
Along these lines, a recent body of economic research has shown that the 
personal interests of the senior executives of the largest companies have indeed 
become closer to those of the shareholders than envisioned by Berle and Means 
in their writing on the divorce between ownership and management. Accord-
ing to the earlier view, managers of the corporation used its resources to enhance 
their personal interests, rather than those of the shareholders!0 
The more current and upbeat conclusion is based primarily on the fact that 
top management has often become large holders of their company's stock. Fre-
quently, the yearly change in the market value of an executive's shares in his 
company exceeds substantially his total formal compensation! 1This develop-
ment suggests that the concerns about management domination of the board 
may not be relevant or, at the least, they are overstated. 
However, this line of reasoning should not be pushed too far. The very per-
sonal and thus limited nature of the shareholder orientation of top manage-
ment should not be misunderstood. Shareholder-managers do not hesitate to 
propose "greenmail" payments-above-market purchases of the shares held 
by potential raiders-in order to maintain their control of the company. Studies 
show that shareholders suffer when managements engage in such strategies 
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to insulate the company from efforts of outsiders to gain control. (Manage-
ment actions that encourage bidders to raise their offers, in contrast, tend to 
enhance shareholder wealth.) 12 
Some corporate managements, and their boards, have gone much further 
than greenmail, disposing of the corporation's most attractive assets in an effort 
to discourage an unwanted takeover. In these circumstances, it is clear that-
when the welfare of specific managers diverges from that of shareholders in 
general- the company's executives have little difficulty in choosing their own 
self-interest. 
B. "The Board Is Dominated By The CEO" 
A closely related criticism is that the board,s deliberations are dominated 
by the CEO, who typically also serves as chairman. 
When the CEO controls both the agenda and conduct of boardroom pro-
ceedings as well as the day-to-day performance of the company, the power of 
the individual director can indeed become attenuated. In the case of 77 per-
cent of the corporations surveyed in a 1984 study, the chairman of the board 
is also the chief executive officer. Moreover, 42 percent reported that their CEO 
is also the chief operating officer. 13 
Management consultants report that many directors appear to act as part 
of top management, rather than as monitors able and willing to reward and 
penalize the performance of senior executives. 14 Also, they contend that it is 
the rare board that dares to remove a CEO who is incompetent, let alone one 
who is merely mediocre. 15 
A former board chairman concludes that the board environment is not par-
ticularly conducive to nurturing challenge when most directors are beholden 
to the chairman-CEO. 16 Another states that the "ambiguity" of the role of the 
corporate board begins with the prevailing combination of management leader-
ship and board leadership in the same person. 17 One senior executive provides 
a pithy evaluation of the relationship: 
Management creates the policies ... We tell our directors the direction of 
the company and the reasons for it. Theoretically, the board has a right of 
veto, but they never exercise it ... 18 
On reflection, it should not be surprising that CEOs believe that they do 
not jump to the signals of board members. But, similarly, it may be the rare 
board member who considers the position to be that of a mere "rubber stamp~' 
It is interesting to note the high departure rate of CEOs of major corporations 
who approach the customary retirement age of 65. For younger individuals 
who serve as executives, the odds are only one in six that they will leave the 
job in a given year. For those 64 years of age, the odds are one out of two. 19 
That surely shows that board policies can be meaningful and that many CEOS 
do conform to them. 
As we will see in Section V, numerous suggestions have been made to dilute 
the current concentration of corporate power in the chairman-CEO. 
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C. "The Board Is Plagued With Conflicts of Interest" 
Corporate directors often are criticized for conflicts of interest and for show-
ing greater concern for the welfare of other companies. Many outside direc-
tors of corporations do business with the companies on whose board they serve. 
The literature contains a number of cases of apparent wrongdoing on the part 
of outside directors who also were officers of companies that supplied services 
to the corporation. 20 
In the case of the Penn Central, a staff report of the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency of the U.S. House of Representatives censured the company's 
board members for their excessive involvement in other corporate boards. The 
Committee staff noted the subservience of many of the outside directors to 
the interests of the financial institutions of which they were officers.2' 
A broader criticism has been leveled at investment and commercial bankers 
serving on corporate boards. Critics note the possibilities of both direct con-
flicts of interest and restricting the company to using the services of the invest-
ment banker or commercial banker represented on the board. 22 
There is, however, another side to the conflict-of-interest argument. Keep-
ing suppliers and bankers off the board may generate substantial costs to new, 
small, and marginal firms. Having creditors on the board provides them with 
an opportunity to monitor the firm's activities and may be in lieu of drastic 
loan covenants. The alternative may be, in a pristine environment which ex-
cludes all "dependent" outside directors, a lessened availability of credit to 
some corporations. 23 However, studies show that financial institutions tend to 
avoid serving on the boards of risky companies. 24 Thus, the presence of 
prestigious bankers on a board can be an important signal to other business 
firms of the creditworthiness of the company. The service of such "dependent" 
outside directors may be an efficient way of transmitting information and may 
thus reduce the interest rates that the company pays on its indebtedness. 
In the case of the larger firms, in contrast, a different problem is emerging, 
one that does not involve any conflicts of interest, at least as technically defined 
by the law. An example is the opportunity for "backscratching" in setting 
management compensation by the board's compensation committee. This 
group typically is dominated by outside directors. What's wrong with that? 
After all, corporate critics have recommended that very approach. 25 
The problem is that frequently those outside directors are senior officers 
of other firms, who are very sympathetic to motions for generous increases 
in the compensation of their counterparts. Aside from the intrinsic merits of 
the matter, their self-interest dictates such a stand. After all, the compensa-
tion committees of their own boards are often similarly composed of CEOs 
of peer firms. Moreover, the management consultants advising those com-
mittees take full account of such peer group action by the other boards. The 
ratchet effect that results is quite obvious. 
Several studies of selected samples of large corporations show a limited rela-
tionship between the remuneration of top management and the performance 
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of their companies. At times, compensation of officers was increasing even 
when the value of the company's stock was decreasing significantly. 26 As we 
will see subsequently, these officials may simultaneously be suffering substantial 
losses because of the negative effects on their own stock portfolios. Never-
theless, such reports do little to inspire confidence in the actions of board com-
pensation committees. 
In recent years, many corporations have changed their compensation plans 
for top management from market-based approaches (such as stock options) 
to performance plans (based on objective measures of the company's perfor-
mance).27 Thus, if a takeover occurs, a manager compensated via performance 
plans does not necessarily share in the market appreciation associated with 
the merger. This suggests that senior executives now may have more to lose 
from a takeover. 28 
Other potential conflicts of interest may arise on a board when nominally 
independent outside directors, in practice, represent the special interests of the 
local community. This may be the case when they are senior officers of local 
companies that primarily sell goods and services to the surrounding area. Under 
the circumstances, they may see great value in the company donating lavishly 
to local causes-even if its markets are national or international. 
In contrast, some of the so-called dependent outside directors, such as widely-
criticized bankers and other creditors, may take a more cautious and indepen-
dent attitude toward spending the company's money. This illustrates the dif-
ficulty of developing useful hard and fast rules in these areas of managerial 
decision-making. 
Geneen raises a different aspect of the conflict of interest question. He asks 
how independent board members can be if they accept all the perks heaped 
on them by the management they are to judge. "Isn't there a fundamental con-
flict of interest here? Certainly the board would object if the company's pur-
chasing agent accepted free dinners and trips abroad from suppliers~' 29 
Geneen's point does seem to be overstated. It is hard to conjur up an outside 
director who feels beholden to the management because they sign for the lunch 
or dinner tab at board meetings. On the other hand, in those circumstances 
where generous directors' fees become a major portion of the individual's in-
come, the feeling of independence may be weakened. 
An experienced director reports that he never saw a subordinate 
officer serving on a board dissent from the position taken by 
the Chief Executive Officer. 
A far more serious concern is the relationship of the inside directors to the 
chairman-CEO. After all, he (or she) is their day-to-day supervisor, usually 
with the effective authority to radically change their role in the company and 
even to fire or demote them. An experienced director such as Courtney Brown 
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reports that he never saw a subordinate officer serving on a board dissent from 
the position taken by the CEO. 
In contrast, those in favor of having inside directors serve on a board believe 
that they provide a valuable window on the corporation. Also, they reduce the 
likelihood that the CEO can control the board by virtue of being the sole source 
of information about the organization. 30 
Important changes have been made voluntarily in board policies and pro-
cedures in response to the criticisms that have been leveled. The next section 
examines the key voluntary developments in recent years. 
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IV. Voluntary Changes in the Boardroom 
While the criticism by writers on corporate governance continues unabated, 
important changes in the boardroom are being made on a voluntary basis. 
These adaptive adjustments have resulted from significant shifts in the environ-
ment in which corporations and their boards function. Developments in that 
external environment have included increased government regulation and the 
threat of further intervention, heightened activity by citizen groups, greater 
foreign competition, rising levels of litigation by shareholders, and criticism 
from the press. 
Some international perspective is useful. Most of the major industrialized, 
capitalist nations have been reconsidering the role of the corporate board of 
directors. Several Western European countries have changed the statutory 
requirements imposed on corporate boards. For example, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Austria have enacted "co-determination" statutes which 
require labor union representation on major company boards. In Sweden, the 
government appoints public representatives to the boards of large companies. 
In the United States, in contrast, the key developments in the nature of boards 
of directors have come from the voluntary changes instituted by the corpora-
tions themselves. Because of the informal nature of these adjustments, varia-
tions are great and descriptions of trends are subjective and impressionistic. 
In good measure, these voluntary developments are responses to the various 
criticisms leveled at the board as an institution. 1 In part, these changes deflect 
or at least reduce the pressures for new statutes or regulations requiring com-
pulsory modifications in corporate governance. Also, the increased liability 
of corporate directors for their actions is reinforcing the trend toward their 
greater involvement in company decision-making. 
Efforts to philosophize on existing shortcomings in corporate governance 
should not blind us to the reality that boards of directors are functioning more 
aggressively and more critically. 2 According to the board chairman of a major 
Many boards are taking on a more active role; "passive ceremonial 
directors are fast becoming an endangered species.,, 
consulting firm, "passive ceremonial directors are fast becoming an endangered 
species .. ~' 3 A recent survey of the boards of directors of large American cor-
porations concludes that "the days of the 'rubber stamp' board are over.' 4 
Clearly, many boards are taking on a more active role. The key structural 
changes are described below. 
A. The Shift to Outside Directors 
1. Outside directors have become a majority of most boards of large com-
panies in the United States-and the move toward more outside directors 
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continues. The proportion of industrial corporations in the United States with 
majorities of outsiders on their boards increased from 50 percent in 1938 to 
83 percent in 1979.5 A 1984 study reported that the typical board of the larger 
corporations contained nine outside directors and four inside directors or a 
ratio of 69 to 31 percent. 
The larger the firm, the more likely is the predominance of outside direc-
tors. In fact, the biggest companies were the first to name a majority of out-
side directors. The extent to which the board decision-making process changes 
with a shift to outside directors is examined in later sections of this report. In 
any event, the prevalence of "dependent" outside directors is diminishing. In 
1974, commercial bankers served on slightly more than one-half of corporate 
boards and only on 31 percent in 1984. Similarly, attorneys providing legal 
services for the company served on 28 percent of corporate boards in 1984, 
down from 40 percent in 1974.6 
2. A broader diversity of backgrounds is evident in the types of persons 
serving on corporate boards. Increased numbers of directors have public service, 
academic, and scientific experience. Boards also include rising percentages of 
women and minorities. One survey shows that 45 percent of the boards exam-
ined had female directors in 1984 compared to 11 percent in 1974. During the 
same period, the percentage of boards with ethnic minority members rose from 
11 percent to 26 percent; those with academics from 36 percent to 52 percent; 
and those with former government officials from 12 percent to 31 percent. 7 
Data are lacking, however, on the impact of these changes on board decision-
making. Yet, we can infer a positive role because of the increased activity on 
the part of corporate boards generally. 
B. The Rise of Strong Committees 
3. Auditing committees have become a nearly universal phenomenon. 
Typically, these financial oversight bodies are composed entirely of indepen-
dent outside directors (that is an absolute requirement for firms listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange). The audit committees have direct access to both 
outside and inside auditors and usually review the financial aspects of com-
pany operations in great detail. As recently as 1973, only one-half of large U.S. 
corporations had auditing committees. By 1983, 95 percent of large U.S. firms 
had such a committee. A 1984 study indicated the proportion at 98 percent. 8 
Yet the heightened activism of auditing committees has not prevented a spate 
of recently revealed shortcomings in the financial practices of leading defense 
contractors. Despite the impressive array of internal and external auditors 
bolstering the auditing committees, stories on dog kennel fees charged to the 
company (and in part passed on to the government as overhead costs) have 
reduced public confidence in corporate performance. Actually, such practices 
are in the minority and frowned upon, but they are not new. In 1977, one 
executive used his company's private plane to fly his pedigreed bull terriers 
to and from dog shows. 9 
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4. In many companies, nominating committees propose both candidates for 
the board and senior officers. These committees usually have a strong majority 
of outside directors (typically, four out of five). A 1984 study reported that 
48 percent of the companies surveyed had nominating committees. This com-
pares to 7 percent in 1973. These statistics do little to illuminate the powerful 
role of the CEO in initiating or informally approving committee selections. 
As in many other areas of corporate governance, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between form and substance. 
5. In most large companies, compensation committees evaluate the per-
formance of top executives and determine the terms and conditions of their 
employment. These committees are composed largely or entirely of outside 
directors. In 1983, 88 percent of the large companies surveyed had compen-
sation committees. In practice, many of these committees rely extensively on 
outside consultants hired by the management. As noted earlier, those com-
pensation surveys often set the framework for committee deliberations. 
In the past decade, the percentage increase in the average chief executive's 
spendable income probably was double that of foremen and hourly workers. 
But of greater relevance is the evidence of a positive relationship between 
executive pay and the returns achieved by shareholders. 10 Yet, board members 
depend heavily on chief executives for guidance in making compensation deci-
sions, often signaling their views by the increases they propose for their sub-
ordinates. 11 On the other hand, it can be inferred from the close relationship 
between top management compensation and the firm's stock price performance 
that, at least in a general way, corporate senior managers have powerful incen-
tives to respond to the desires of the shareholders, 12 whether or not the com-
pensation committees perform their assigned task effectively. 
6. Since 1970, about 100 major companies have established public policy 
committees of their boards. These committees give board level attention to com-
pany policies and performance on subjects of special public concern. Topics 
with which public policy committees often deal include affirmative action and 
equal employment opportunity, employee health and safety, company impact 
on the environment, corporate political activities, consumer affairs, and 
ethics. 13 Cynics may wonder whether this new activity is mainly a sop to the 
proponents of greater corporate social responsibility, rather than a substan-
tive change in business policy. Yet the potential for broadening the horizons 
of corporate decision-making is now present. 
C. The Expanded Flow of Information 
7. Internal management and accounting control systems have been 
strengthened. In part, the impetus has come from the need to comply with the 
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The activities of the audit 
committees surely are a reinforcing factor. As a result, the flow of informa-
tion to board members has been upgraded and expanded. 
As a positive byproduct of these internally-oriented activities, a substantial 
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increase has occurred in the voluntary disclosure of company information. The 
heightened public and shareholder interest in corporate performance has been 
a contributing influence. 
D. A Broader View of the Voluntary Changes 
Scholars have provided a broader view of the changes that are occurring in 
the boardroom. They see the typical corporate board as moving through three 
stages. 14 
The typical corporate board is moving through three stages-
ulegitimizing,'' uauditing" and udirecting." For many boards, 
phase three remains a target to strive for. 
In the first phase, which can be referred to as the legitimizing role, the direc-
tors merely sign the necessary legal papers and the board adopts the resolu-
tions required by law. Little involvement occurs in decision-making activities. 
Any suggestion of change in a resolution proposed for board action is tanta-
mount to voting a lack of confidence in management. Except for small and 
closely held corporations, this phase of corporate governance (or the lack 
thereof) has passed into history. 
Subsequently, in the second phase of development, the board adopts the 
auditing role. In this mode, the Board recommends specific actions to improve 
the functioning of the management control or auditing process. Specific recom-
mendations tend to relate to technical matters such as reporting procedures. 
Virtually every large and medium size company, as well as many smaller firms, 
has advanced fully into this second phase and often beyond it. 
Many companies are moving to a higher, third phase in the development of 
board influence. In this directing role, the board becomes more involved in 
choosing alternative directions, key strategies, and major investments. The focus 
is increasingly on the future. In the case of many boards, this third phase is 
still just a target to strive for, although it increasingly is an accurate descrip-
tion of current boardroom activity. 
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V. Popular Proposals for Further Change 
The voluntary evolution of the corporate board that has taken place in the 
United States in recent years does not satisfy the critics. Several key proposals 
for further change occur time and again in professional writings on boards 
of directors. Let us examine these suggestions as well as several off-beat ideas. 
A. Give the Corpornte Board More Authority 
Many students of corporate governance respond to the litany of complaints 
about the work of the board with a plea to strengthen the role of the institu-
tion. A representative view of this position was presented by the late Neil H. 
Jacoby, former dean of the UCLA Business School and an active board 
member. He contended that there is merit to the various complaints about the 
shortcomings of corporate boards of directors. Thus he urged that the institu-
tion should be reformed to cure its "three most frequent weaknesses": a 
restricted social perspective, domination by the company's management, and 
conflicts of interest with financial institutions. 1 
His recommendations to carry out these changes were rather general. Jacoby 
concluded that the key to better corporate government is to increase the power, 
the independence, the range of competence, and the compensation of outside 
directors in public corporations. How to accomplish this change in a construc-
tive manner is the heart of the problem. Surely, turning the board into a 
debating society would be undesirable. 
The management literature· provides a conceptual basis for strengthening 
the role of the directors, distinguishing between the board's function of gov-
erning and the executive responsibility for managing. In this view, the board 
is concerned with the basic purpose of the enterprise. Its primary focus is on 
the firm's continuity and on overseeing its strategic direction and the relation-
ship to its external constituencies. 
Management, in contrast, is seen as more of a hands-on activity. This involves 
performing or supervising action to accomplish assigned objectives over a 
definite time frame and in the organization prescribed by the board. 2 
Economists make a similar distinction. They emphasize the separation of the 
initiation and implementation of decisions (a management function) from 
ratification and monitoring of those decisions (the board's responsibility). 
In this view, the board is not an effective device for decision control unless 
it limits the "decision discretion" of individual top managers. Accordingly, the 
domination of corporate decision-making processes by the chief executive 
officer signals the absence of that desirable separation of decision manage-
ment and decision control. 3 We can recall, from Section II, that the legal powers 
of the board of directors fully cover the strong role envisioned here. As we will 
see later in this section, part of the problem is the unwillingness of many direc-
tors to assume this role. 
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Several authorities have proposed that outside directors on the board gen-
erally be given more staff support to help them carry out their functions more 
effectively. 4 As a precedent, we can cite the fact that, in the mutual fund 
industry, independent directors sometimes hire outside experts to help review 
investment advisory contracts. 
An alternative approach is to make the corporate secretary and related per-
sonnel responsible only to the board. However, the provision of independent 
resources to the board raises severe problems where the CEO dominates board 
decision-making. 5 Moreover, growth of the board staff would likely create a 
competition for influence with the existing corporate organization. That would 
make more difficult the relationship between senior managers and outside 
directors. 
B. Shift the Balance of Power to Outside Directors 
The most controversial recommendations deal with the question as to 
whether inside (or management) directors should serve on the corporate board. 
The pioneer proposal in this field was made by the late Supreme Court Justice 
William 0. Douglas in 1934, when he was chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission: "The minimal requirements in this regard are statutory 
provisions that a board of directors shall be composed of stockholders who 
are not employees or officers of the corporation. " 6 
The result of Justice Douglas' proposal would be a corporate board con-
sisting entirely of outside directors. He did not distinguish between indepen-
dent and other outside directors. Douglas' idea, however, remained a curiosity 
in the legal literature for over four decades. 
Harold M. Williams, who has served as CEO and board member of many 
corporations and nonprofit institutions, joined the issue in resurfacing a varia-
tion of Douglas' general approach in 1978, when he was chairman of the SEC. 
He contended that some people do not belong on boards, specifying members 
of management and "dependent" outsiders. The latter include outside counsel 
investment bankers, commercial bankers, and others who might realisticall; 
be considered suppliers hired by management. Williams recommended that 
the chief executive should be the only member of management to serve on the 
board. 7 The SEC considered Williams' suggestions but took no action on them. 
In 1984, Harold Geneen returned to Douglas' pristine position. He suggested 
that the best way for a board of directors to regain its independence is to take 
all the management members off the board, including the chief executive. Each 
group-board and management-would then have separate and distinct 
responsibilities. 8 We can only speculate as to Geneen's reaction if an outside 
director had dared to make that suggestion at ITT while he was board 
chairman! 
Less extreme positions on the issue of inside versus outside directors have 
been taken by such organizations as the American Assembly, the American 
Law Institute (ALI), and the American Bar Association. 
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In 1978, the American Assembly proposed that the majority of board 
members should come from outside corporate management, "unencumbered 
by relationships which limit their independence. " 9 Unlike Williams, the group 
recommended that key inside managers, in addition to the chief executive offi-
cer, be eligible to serve. They noted that the presence of other management 
officials on the board also helps outside members evaluate possible successors 
to the chief executive. 
A draft "restatement" of corporate governance law by the American Law 
Institute would codify certain aspects of prevailing practice. For example, the 
draft restatement would require amending corporate law to mandate that a 
majority of the members of a board of a publicly held corporation be direc-
tors who have "no significant relationships" with the company's senior 
management. 10 
The ALI draft also proposes that corporate law should require every large 
publicly held corporation to set up audit, nominating, and compensation com-
mittees (Section IV showed that this has become the general practice in the 
United States). The vehement opposition from the business community 11 
and from some scholars 12 has led to lengthy consideration of the ALI draft, 
but so far no action has been taken. 
The Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the American 
Bar Association has developed a proposed model for the board of a publicly-
owned corporation which is less extreme than the ALI draft restatement. 
According to the ABA group, the model Board should include "a significant 
number" of members who are able to provide independent judgment regard-
ing the proposals under consideration. 13 
Although the concept of outside directors controlling the board 
is appealing, there has been no comprehensive analysis to date 
that demonstrates that the performance of companies with 
outside-dominated boards is superior. 
Although I share the prevailing positive attitude toward outside directors 
dominating a corporate board, I know of no comprehensive analysis that 
demonstrates that the performance of companies with outside-dominated 
boards is superior. 14 One study covering 103large companies concluded that, 
on the average, inside-dominated boards of directors were more effective than 
outside-dominated boards. However, the data are more than two decades old. 15 
Table 2 (p. 28) compares the formal strengths and weaknesses of inside and 
outside directors. Outside directors can perform important but limited func-
tions in the areas in which shareholders are most vulnerable: 
• Protecting against a take-the-money-and-run management; 
• Serving as a check on self-dealing and fraud; 
• Insisting on proper auditing procedures; 
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• Reviewing corporate decisions of a magnitude sufficient to entail the risk 
of foul play; 
• Providing a perspective different from that of people immersed in the com-
pany's affairs; 
• Providing helpful analysis in decision-making; and 
• Asking tough questions about a proposal which even a fully conscientious 
management may not face directly because of an unconscious pride of 
authorship. 16 
However, management's knowledge and experience are inevitably superior 
to those who play a part-time role and receive part-time compensation. Out-
side directors cannot be on an equal footing with management unless they 
spend comparable amounts of time, receive comparable compensation, and 
have comparable resources. Then, however, they are, in good measure, "inside" 
directors. 
In a fundamental sense, the basic question involved is how to balance objec-
tivity of judgment with knowledge of the company. One obvious answer is to 
combine a majority of independent directors with an adequate number of 
management directors. If the outsiders take their role seriously, objectivity is 
served and if the insiders are represented on the board, its knowledge base is 
greatly increased. 17 Reginald H. Jones emphasizes the desirability of having 
a "critical mass" of outside directors. Rather than specifying a specific pro-
portion, he urges a number sufficiently large to have a significant impact on 
the board's decision-making process. 18 
Having a preponderance of outside directors does not ensure a company 
against bad judgment or even dishonesty. That was certainly the experience 
of a number of prominent companies in the 1970s. At Lockheed, during the 
time of its bribery problems, the ratio of outside directors to insiders was 12 
to 5. Penn Central, when it went bankrupt, had 18 outsiders and 4 insiders. 
At Gulf Oil, during its illegal payments travail, the ratio of outside to inside 
directors was 9 to 3. W. T. Grant's ratio, when it declared bankruptcy, was 11 
to 6. 19 
It also has been suggested that boards should consider formalizing the posi-
tion of devil's advocate, assigning the responsibility on a rotating basis. 
Presumably, under this approach, no single director will "outwear his 
welcome, " yet the management directors will hear criticism from someone who 
is required to assume that task. A negative aspect is that the work of the "offi-
cial critic" may expose the board to greater risks of liability. 20 A variation of 
that suggestion was made by Gordon. He proposes that the board act as 
management auditors, reporting periodically to stockholders and the public 
on the company's progress and the quality of its leadership. Warning that the 
board should not try to run the company, he acknowledges that the auditing 
and reporting function would result in a new type of board. 21 
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Table 2 
CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTSIDER-DOMINATED BOARDS 
Advantages 
1. Provide a bridge between share-
holders and professional 
managers. 
2. Extra layer of review to con-
firm major decisions. 
3. Independent resolution of 
inherent insider conflicts-
compensation, performance 
review, etc. 
4. Prominent directors enhance 
corporate image. 
Disadvantages 
1. Outside directors spend too 
little time on board matters. 
2. They show little interest in 
the company except in times of 
crisis. 
3. Lack good knowledge of the 
company and are not competent 
to make key decisions. 
4. Independence may be an illusion. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INSIDER-DOMINATED BOARDS 
Advantages 
1. Intimate familiarity with 
company operations. 
2. Substantial time devoted to 
board matters. 
3. Unanimity of purpose. 
4. Policymakers are responsible 
for execution and success of 
policy. 
Disadvantages 
1. Lack of independent perspective. 
2. May fail to detect changes in 
external environment. 
3. Possibility of self-dealing and 
excessive compensation. 
4. Cannot independently judge 
their own performance. 
Source: Compiled from Board Models, Corporate Directors' Special Report 
Series, Vol. III (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Corporate 
Directors, undated). 
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And that gets us back to the question that is rarely raised in the formal 
writings on corporate governance-what considerations motivate and guide 
the directors in their decision-making? Implicitly, most of the literature assumes 
that outside directors will do a better job than inside directors. Yet, the key 
point really is that the outside directors should be expected to do a different 
job of decision-making, especially to respond more fully to the desires of the 
stockowners. Thus, even without changing the board's formal structure or its 
operating procedures, an increasing number of managements is restructuring 
their companies to maximize shareholder value. 22 Such actions may involve 
selling off parts of the company that involve historic tradition but low returns. 
It will be recognized that this approach runs counter to the sales or size max-
imization which is supposed to motivate many corporate managers. 23 
C. Separate the CEO from the Board Chairmanship 
One specific proposal to strengthen the position of outside directors is to 
require the chairman of the board to be an outside director. This would separate 
the management role of CEO and the governing role of presiding officer in 
the boardroom. The American Assembly suggests this approach, as does 
Harold Williams. He emphasizes the importance of having the agenda of issues 
presented at board meetings determined by a chairman who is not a member 
of management. 24 These suggestions differ from current practice, where the 
board chairman is almost invariably an inside director, and usually but not 
universally also the CEO. 
It has been suggested that the board chairman act as the "discussion leader. " 
That person, avoiding the expression of personal views, would stimulate par-
ticipation by all directors, encourage questions, and protect those holding 
minority positions. This approach, it is contended, would develop an atmos-
phere of open inquiry and encourage the impartial exploration of a wide range 
of policy alternatives. Moreover, even as an individual director, the CEO's view 
would carry a great deal of weight. It is held that, in contrast, the traditional 
approach whereby the CEO announces his position at the outset "colors the 
decisions. " 25 
At times the separation operates effectively, but Jones reminds us that often 
it creates an unworkable, competitive situation between the occupants of the 
two posts. Thus, the separation of the functions of CEO and board chairman 
will only work if the people involved are compatible and operate in good faith. 
But, when serious rivalries develop between the two "consuls!' great damage 
can be done to the enterprise. Jones concludes that experience and common 
sense tell us to expect this rivalry in a considerable number of cases. 26 
This separation is very common for non-profit institutions, where it has not 
been challenged or greatly criticized. Howeve.:., :n. i l.:.e case of many non-profit 
institutions, such as hospitals, the board members are usually very senior to 
the chief administrator in terms of their professional or business accomp-
lishments and total income. In the case of the corporate board, in contrast, 
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the outside directors are often the peers of the CEO, which makes for a very 
different working relationship. 
D. Tie Liability to Responsibility 
One way to introduce independence in the board of directors is to strip away 
some of the protection given to board members. Harold Geneen asks, "What's 
wrong with holding directors personally responsible-in terms of money from 
their own pockets up to some reasonable limit?" He would tie the liability to 
the size of directors' fees. 27 Directors who just did it for the honor would have 
little liability. Geneen's suggestion possesses serious defects. Would it be wise 
to entrust the greatest amounts of corporate power to the people who have 
the least stake in the outcome? 
But this suggestion does raise the important question of directors' liability. 
For those directors who assume substantial financial responsibility (far more 
so than for many other forms of business activity), Geneen's proposal does 
not deal with the problem of recruiting and retaining qualified individuals. 
The conclusion of Judge Learned Hand on this point is worth considering: 
"No men of sense would take the office, if the law imposed on them a guar-
anty of the general success of their companies .. ~' 28 
"No men of sense would take the office [of director], if the law imposed 
on them a guaranty of the general success of their companies ... " 
In current practice, the "business judgment" rule is supposed to protect direc-
tors from liability for their mistaken business decisions, in the absence of fraud, 
gross negligence, or self-dealing. One legal commentator has summarized the 
rule: 
A court ... will not substitute its judgment for that of directors when they 
act reasonably and in good faith. In the absence of self-deali~g, there!ore, 
if a decision of a board of directors can be attributed to "any rat10nal busmess 
purpose, " a court will not hold a director liable for honest errors or mistakes 
of judgment. 29 
Several rationales support this rule: encouraging qualified persons to serve 
as directors, minimizing judicial interference to permit business enterprises to 
function at maximum efficiency, freeing directors to take business risks without 
inordinate caution, and avoiding the imposition of unfair liabilities by judges 
and juries who lack competence to evaluate complex business decisions. 30 
Moreover, the market can generally be relied upon to punish companies for 
the negative outcomes of honest but erroneous decisions. 
In general, the courts have been extremely reluctant to second-guess the judg-
ment of management and directors who have been running the business. 31 
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Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act (the part dealing with boards 
of directors) concludes with the following statement: 
Where a director has exercised his duties of oversight in the manner con-
templated by Section 35, it is intended that he will have no liability by reason 
of being or having been a director of the corporation. 32 
Nevertheless, several court decisions have narrowed the scope of the business 
judgment rule. For example, in 1968 a court held that outside directors had 
failed to fulfill their "due diligence" responsibilities in connection with the 
preparation of a prospectus for a public offering of securities. In a 1972 case, 
outside directors were held liable for their negligence in failing to review a 
merger proxy statement carefully enough.33 
In January 1985, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that the directors 
of a company breached their fiduciary duty to shareholders when they agreed 
very quickly to the sale of the company to another corporation. The court held 
that the directors acted too hastily and did not seek enough information to 
make a responsible decision. Another court will decide if the price paid was 
too low. If so, the directors may have to pay the shareholders the difference 
between such higher value and the price actually received. 34 
Increasing the liability of individual directors for their "business judgment" 
actions may unintentionally discourage experienced people from accepting new 
board positions. 35 Moreover, increasing the liability of directors may generate 
a feedback effect in terms of reducing their desire to innovate and make 
changes. 
Liability insurance for directors is becoming more expensive and more dif-
ficult to obtain. Some insurers are shying away from companies involved in 
takeover battles. 36 The absence of such insurance would make recruitment of 
directors more difficult. 
E. Select Directors from Major Constituencies 
In the 1970s, proposals were frequently made for stockholders to select direc-
tors from key "constituency" groups representing consumers, civil rights acti-
vists, ecologists, etc. Ralph Nader also proposed that, for the largest companies, 
a portion of the directors be chosen by national elections. (Consider the con-
sequences of adding "only" a few hundred director candidates to the November 
ballot!) Individual directors would be assigned responsibility for specific areas 
of company operations, such as employee relations. Supposedly, such action 
would "popularize" boards of directors. 37 
The specific proposals were subjected to great criticism when they were first 
made. 38 Nevertheless, in recent years, a body of theory has developed which, 
to a limited extent, provides a conceptual underpinning for that approach. 
Using a broad concept of the ownership of the business firm, some scholars 
maintain that ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership of 
the firm. Thus, each factor in the firm is seen as being owned by someone. 39 
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In this view, control over the company's decisions is not necessarily the pro-
vince of security holders. To bolster this position, we can note that stockholders 
are often referred to as investors rather than owners. 
This approach is a variation on an older theme-that economic interest 
groups to which the company is beholden should be represented on the board. 
Officers of key creditors have often been on a company's board, as well as major 
customers and suppliers. The community is frequently represented, with civic 
leaders-ranging from heads of local organizations to the president of the state 
university-serving as directors. Although, as shown earlier, the number of 
blacks and women board members has risen substantially, corporations have 
avoided appointing directors who are beholden to specific social interest groups, 
such as consumer or civil rights organizations. 
The one exception to this avoidance of interest group representation on the 
board is the selective election of labor leaders. This development almost always 
comes about in conjunction with union concessions on wage costs. In 1980, 
Chrysler became the first major U.S. corporation to elect a union officer to 
its board. In 1982, Pan American World Airways added a union representative 
to its board. In 1984, two union officers were elected directors of Eastern Air 
Lines. 
Union memberships on corporate boards are still isolated examples. 
Although the concept of employee representation on the board is common in 
Western Europe, it is not a widely accepted notion in the United States and 
it remains a voluntary matter. It is generally recognized that the idea of con-
stituency directors is difficult to re~oncile with the central principle of the 
accountability of the directors to the owners of the enterprise. 
Douglas Fraser, who was the first labor leader to serve on the Chrysler board, 
came away from his service as director with a very positive attitude. He claimed 
that labor union leaders are more knowledgable about the company's opera-
tions than other outside directors. Thus, labor directors can raise better ques-
tions and offer more useful insights. To avoid conflicts of interest, Fraser stayed 
away from board discussions dealing with collective bargaining. 40 
Other observers provide a far more negative view of the phenomenon of 
special-interest directors. Recent behaviorial science research suggests that 
appointing board members to represent different corporate constituencies is 
counterproductive. For example, some empirical evidence shows that an adver-
sary relationship among members reduces the quality of decision-making. 
Groups faced with intense disagreement either compromise on a third deci-
sion or the less aggressive members surrender to the other faction. 41 
The notion of constituency directors has been labeled a 
"Noah,s Ark proposat, and a "tower of Babel.,, 
The notion of constituency directors has been labeled a "Noah's Ark pro-
posal" and a "tower of Babel~' Irving Shapiro, retired CEO and board chair-
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~an of DuPont, sees it as an extension of the false parallel between corpora-
tions and elected governments. The basic flaw in the notion is that people 
representing specific interest groups would by definition be committed to the 
goals of their groups. Shapiro notes that it is a matter of law and not simply 
?f tradition that directors serve the organization as a whole. 42 Another negative 
IS th~t the presence of special-interest directors on the board would put a 
premmm on logrolling. " 43 The result might also be the reduction of serious 
matters determined at formal board meetings. 
The American Bar Association notes that, under United States law, neither 
the corporation nor the individual director is in general responsible to other 
constituencies, such as employees, customers, or the community. However, the 
ABA's Corporate Director,s Guidebook goes on to state the following 
qualification: 
Nevertheless, the director should be concerned that the corporation con-
ducts i.ts affai~s wit.h ?ue appreciation of public expectations, not only by 
compliance with existmg laws but also alert recognition of trends in the law 
and social norms which may affect the corporation's activities in the future. 44 
The evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of shareholders have 
little interest in greater participation in the details of corporate governance or 
in the firm's broader social responsibility. They consistently vote down resolu-
tions which limit the independence of management, regardless of the topic. 
In any given year, defeated proposals have ranged from requests to add women 
to the board of directors to establishment of corporate responsibility com-
mittees to disclosure of minority group employment.45 Yet each of these changes 
has been undertaken by many corporate managements on a voluntary basis. 
The overriding concern of shareholders is with dividends and the market 
price of their shares, factors which the self-styled corporate activists usually 
ignore. Numerous instances at annual meetings demonstrate the antagonism 
of serious investors to social activists who attempt to use corporate resources 
to further their own political and social agendas. This is in dramatic contrast 
to the frequently positive attitudes of shareholders to hostile takeover efforts 
which appear to offer large and immediate increases in stockholder wealth. 
F. Limitations of Reform Proposals 
Several writers on corporate governance have noted the limitations of for-
mal changes. Irving Shapiro warns that the danger is not that boards will pick 
the wrong formula, but that boards will put too much emphasis on the wrong 
details. 46 Former SEC commissioner Roberta Karmel points out that there is 
little evidence that an independent board of directors would be more informed 
or more competent or would function any better or any differently than a board 
selected by management: 
Every organization benefits from an outsider's perspective .... However, 
every corporation also needs directors with business acumen, experience and 
33 
expertise, and some corporations have more difficulty obtaining competent 
"independent" directors than others do.47 
Much of the emphasis and fervor on board changes may arise from an over-
dramatization of marginal shifts of limited impact, as well as from the fact 
that much writing on the subject is exhortative, tending to confuse what ought 
to be with what is. We should not underrate the ability of corporations to absorb 
new instructions and new types of individuals by using co-optation, obstruc-
tion, and tokenism. 48 
Although most directors are intellectually aware of and ready for changes 
in the boardroom they are often too emotionally and politically involved to 
allow these changes to occur. It is difficult to acquire the detachment necessary 
to make changes without upsetting relations with management or owners. 49 
Some evidence suggests that recent innovations to strengthen the boards' role 
have been cosmetic. 50 
One detailed study of the board of a major corporation during a period of 
considerable challenge concluded that change in the formal powers of the board 
cannot by itself improve the institution. In that case, the directors did not use 
the powers they had because, as they saw their role, provoking conflict or act-
ing in any way which could be interpreted as hostile to the CEO was unsup-
portive and therefore undesirable. The author concluded that this board 
remained impotent, not for need of more or different reforms, but because 
the directors had never developed the knowledge, attitudes, and skills required 
to use the expanded authority already available. 51 
However close their working relationships with management, outside 
directors must understand that their responsibility to the shareholders 
is basic to the American scheme of corporate governance. 
However close their working relationships with management, outside direc-
tors must understand that their responsibility to the shareholders is basic to 
the American scheme of corporate governance. As two legal authorities point 
out, "It is not by chance that the legal basis for their [the directors'] presence 
on the board is by election by the shareholders rather than by appointment 
by management or by the board itself. " 52 
34 
Notes 
1. Neil H. Jacoby, Corporate Power and Social Responsibility (New York: 
Macmillan, 1973), pp. 176-177. A similar position was taken by a retired 
CEO of Dun & Bradstreet. See U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 428. 
2. Robert K. Mueller, "Changes In the Wind In Corporate Governance," 
Journal of Business Strategy, Spring 1981, p. 9. 
3. Eugene F. Fama and Michael D. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and 
Control," Journal of Law and Economics, June 1983, p. 314. 
4. Cited in Jacoby, Corporate Power, p. 166. 
5. Edward McSweeney, Managing the Managers (New York: Harper and Row, 
1978), pp. 109-111. 
6. William 0. Douglas, "Directors Who Do Not Direct," Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 47, 1934, pp. 1313-1314. 
7. Harold M. Williams, "To Create Public Trust, Make Boards Freer, 
Stronger," Financier, February 1978, p. 39. 
8. Harold G. Geneen, "Why Directors Can't Protect the Shareholders, " For-
tune, September 17, 1984, p. 28. See also Courtney C. Brown, "Why Cor-
porate Officers Should Not Be On Their Own Board," Management 
Review, August 1978, pp. 29-30. 
9. Corporate Governance in America (New York: American Assembly, 1978), 
p. 6. 
10. American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance and Struc-
ture: Restatement and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 1, p. 71. 
11. Statement of the Business Roundtable on the ALPs Proposed HPrinciples 
of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommenda-
tions,, (New York: Business Roundtable, 1983). 
12. Steve Pejovich, Corporate Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Washington 
Legal Foundation, 1984). See also Richard W. Duesenberg, "Governance, 
Who Knows What's Best?" Corporate Director, November/December 
1982, pp. 1-7. 
13. Corporate Director,s Guidebook (Chicago: American Bar Association, 
1978), p. 25. The American Society of Corporate Secretaries has recom-
mended the Guidebook to its more than 1, 700 member companies. Accord-
ing to Frances W. Steckmest, it is now in "wide use~' 
14. Murray L. Weidenbaum, Serving as an Outside Director, Contemporary 
Issues Series 11 (St. Louis: Washington University, Center for the Study 
of American Business, 1984), p. 7. 
15. Stanley C. Vance, Boards of Directors: Structure and Performance, 
(Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1964). 
16. Ralph K. Winter, Government and the Corporation (Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 41. 
35 
17. Richard R. West, "Why Managers Serve on Their Boards of Directors, " 
Management Review, August 1978, p. 30. 
18. Reginald H. Jones, "The Relations Between the Board of Directors and 
Operating Management," in William R. Dill, ed., Running the American 
Corporation (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 98. 
19. Stanley C. Vance, "Director Diversity," Directors & Boards, Spring 1977, 
p. 41. 
20. Robert J. Haft, "Business Decisions By The New Board, "Michigan Law 
Review, November 1981, p. 42. 
21. R. A. Gordon, Business Leadership In the Large Corporation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1948), pp. 347-350. 
22. Daniel F. Cuff, "The Rising Tide of Mergers," The New York Times, June 
28, 1985, p. 27. 
23. William J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth (New York: Har-
court, Brace & World, 1967). 
24. American Assembly, Corporate Governance, p. 7; Williams, "To Create 
Public Trust," p. 39. 
25. Haft, "The New Board," pp. 41-47. 
26. Jones, "Relations Between Board and Management," p. 100. 
27. Geneen, "Why Directors Can't Protect Shareholders, " p. 31. 
28. Quoted in Haft, "The New Board," p. 17. 
29. Caplin, "Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities," Journal of Cor-
porate Law, Vol. 57, 1975, pp. 59-60. 
30. Haft, "The New Board,"· p. 15. See also "The Propriety of Judicial 
Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors," Harvard Law Review, June 
1983, pp. 1894-1913. 
31. Louis Perlmutter, "Current Tender Offer Issues," Texas A & M Business 
Forum, Winter 1984, p. 24. 
32. Corporate Director's Guidebook, p. 43. 
33. Cited in Noyes E. Leech and Robert H. Mundheim, The Outside Director 
of the Public Corporation (New York: Korn/Ferry International, 1976), 
p. 4. 
34. Audit Committees 1985 (New York: Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1985), p. 16. 
35. Lester B. Korn and Richard M. Ferry, TWelfth Annual Board of Directors 
Study (New York: Korn/Ferry International, 1985), p. 1. 
36. David B. Hilder, "Liability Insurance Is Difficult to Find Now For Direc-
tors, Officers," The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1985, p. 1. 
37. Eileen Shanahan, "Business Change: Nader Interview," The New York 
Times, January 24, 1971, p. 3-9. 
38. See Robert Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation (Stanford, Calif.: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1978); M. Bruce Johnson, editor, The Attack 
on Corporate America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). 
39. Eugene F. Fama, ''Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, April 1980, p. 289. 
36 
40. "Labor on the Board, " John F. Kennedy School of Government Bulletin, 
Spring 1985, p. 30. 
41. Haft, "The New Board," p. 24. 
42. Irving S. Shapiro, "Corporate Governance, " in Power and Accountability, 
the 1979 Benjamin F. Fairless Memorial Lectures (Pittsburgh: Carnegie-
Mellon University Press, 1979), p. 51. 
43. E. S. Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1981), p. 284. 
44. Corporate Director's Guidebook, p. 12. 
45. "Results of 1975 Proxy Challenges," Business and Society Review, Fall 
1975, pp. 98-100. See also Milt Moskowitz, "Social Proxy Fights Spice Up 
Annual Meetings," Business and Society Review, Spring 1983, pp. 23-24. 
46. Shapiro, "Corporate Governance, " p. 52. 
47. Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1982), p. 163. 
48. Herman, Corporate Control, pp. 293-4. 
49. Mueller, "Corporate Governance," p. 9. 
50. Haft, "The New Board," p. 2. 
51. Leslie Levy, "Reforming Board Reform," Harvard Business Review, 
January-February 1981, pp. 166-169. 
52. Leech and Mundheim, Outside Director, p. 34. 
37 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A. Findings and Conclusions 
Most writers on the role of the corporate board reach some variation of the 
same conclusion: The board of directors is a vital part of the business firm, 
but it often does an inadequate job of carrying out its responsibility to repre-
sent the shareholders. 
The result can be a policy vacuum which provides opportunity for those out-
side of the corporation to attempt to change prevailing relationships. Dramatic 
moves have been made to respond to-or rather to take advantage of-the 
fundamental shortcoming of corporate boards. These responses have come 
from the so-called predatory raiders, who attempt to take advantage of the 
latent support of shareholders for changes in the status quo. 
Of course, corporate managements view this phenomenon differently. A 
spokesman for the Business Roundtable describes the strategy of "professional 
raiders" as waging "blitzkrieg warfare" devised to outflank the corporate board 
of directors and "stampede the stockholders. " 1 There is no need to glamorize 
the activities or the motives of the raiders. One of the most successful takeover 
specialists describes his efforts as "acting in pursuit of personal financial gain 
and not out of altruism ... I do it to make money. m 
We must recognize the extent to which takeover battles have occurred 
because of the cumulative inaction of boards of directors. 
We must recognize the extent to which takeover battles have occurred because 
of the cumulative inaction of boards of directors. It is easy enough to denounce 
the current crop of financial entrepreneurs who have little interest in the pro-
duction of goods and services, but who profit-often in the form of "green-
mail" -merely from making unsolicited takeover bids. But if they are oppor-
tunists, we must ask whether existing boards and management practices have 
created those opportunities. 
A clue is given, perhaps inadvertently, by the Roundtable's lament that a 
successful corporate defense may involve drastic restructuring "to maximize 
share value in the short run. m Without endorsing the desirability of such a 
change, we can wonder whether-for better or for worse-it does reflect the 
true desires of many shareholders who indeed want "to maximize share value 
in the short run. " 
An earlier report of the Business Roundtable noted that the board of direc-
tors is located at the interface between the owners of the enterprise and its 
management. In this view, the directors are stewards-stewards of the owners' 
interest in the enterprise and stewards also of the owners' legal and ethical 
obligations to other groups affected by corporate activity.4 
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Despite their attraction to defending managements, legislative proposals to 
make unfriendly takeovers more difficult do not deal with the fundamental 
need to respond to the desires of the shareholders. That is both the basic respon-
sibility of the board and the key to its potential power. Corporate officials, 
both board members and officers, may forget that shareholders continually 
vote with their dollars. The less frequently that key issues are presented to the 
shareholders the more likely they are to resort to their ultimate weapon. 
It is ironic that some of the problems of the takeover "targets" may have 
arisen from their desire to be more socially responsible. Much of the modern 
management literature refers to the need for top management to balance the 
desires of employees, customers, suppliers, public interest groups, and 
shareholders. For example, the Committee for Economic Development (CED), 
in its widely circulated report on the social responsibility of business, stated 
that the modern professional manager regards himself as a "trustee" balanc-
ing the interests of many diverse participants and constituents in the enter-
prise (note that shareholders are only listed as one among many worthy groups): 
The chief executive of a large corporation has the problem of reconciling 
the demands of employees for more wages and improved benefit plans, 
customers for lower prices and greater values, vendors for higher prices, 
government for more taxes, stockholders for higher dividends and greater 
capital appreciation ... 5 
The corporate responsibility approach-whether that of the CED or of less 
responsible corporate activists-is fundamentally flawed. It has fostered 
dissatisfaction on the part of shareholders and thereby undermined the sup-
port for management. A 1982 survey by the National Association of Corporate 
Directors revealed that only 53 percent of shareholders believe that directors 
consider stockholder interests when acting on mergers and acquisitions. 6 That 
is not exactly an overwhelming vote of confidence. 
The heart of a positive response to unsolicited takeover efforts is that direc-
tors should act more fully as fiduciaries of the shareholders, as the law requires. 
Let us recall that the same authorities who are almost universally critical of 
the manner in which corporate boards operate are unanimous in their belief 
that a well-functioning governing board is essential to the future of the modern 
corporation. It is not mere coincidence that most of the suggestions that we 
reviewed earlier would enhance the role of the corporate board. 
What is especially significant is that virtually no one has concluded that the 
board of directors has outlived its usefulness. Even such business critics as 
Ralph Nader would lodge major responsibility for governing the corporation 
in a revitalized board of directors. 7 
The most fundamental need in corporate governance is educational- to get 
senior corporate officers to understand their high stake in enhancing the role 
of the board of directors. There would be fewer challenges to the existing 
managements of their companies if more boards acted from a day-to-day con-
cern with the interests of their shareholders. 
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The benefits of a more active board will not be attained without costs. 
Achieving a stronger and more effective board means sharing the authority 
now lodged in the CEO-and at times reaching somewhat different decisions. 
But that does not require the establishment of a competitive power center. It 
does mean being more conscious of the desires of shareholders-and of the 
need to keep them more fully informed. Only one person-the chief 
executive-can guide the corporation's day-to-day activities. That function can-
not be performed by a committee. 8 
Successful directors learn to monitor and question while creating an 
atmosphere of confidence in the management. 
Successful directors learn to monitor and question while creating an atmos-
phere of confidence in the management. On the other hand, a truly secure CEO 
will not attempt to stifle criticism by individual directors. The legendary Alfred 
P. Sloan reportedly made the following statement at a General Motors board 
meeting: 
Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision 
here ... Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until 
our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps 
gain some understanding of what the decision is all about. 9 
It is also important that the members of the board be furnished reports and 
proposals sufficiently in advance so that they can carefully review them prior 
to board or committee meetings. Few directors can intelligently consider a five-
year plan or a major capital project in an hour or two. 
What about the composition of the board? Experience teaches us to be leery 
of simple solutions. An example is the popular proposition that only outside 
directors should serve on a corporate board, with the possible exception of the 
CEO. Boards should not be composed exclusively of any single type of direc-
tor. Diversity of talent is a strength in the management of an economic 
organization. Directors need to be serious, intelligent people and they need 
to be concerned with promoting the shareholders' interest in an environment 
of responsible corporate citizenship-and that is a tall order. 
Corporate boards should consist primarily of independent outsiders but with 
strong representation of knowledgeable insiders. Outside directors should not 
represent banks or law firms or customers or the community in which the cor-
poration happens to have its headquarters. Such actual or potential conflicts 
of interest should be avoided. If banks and other creditors are worried about 
the financial status of the company, the law provides covenants and other 
restrictions to serve their concerns. Modern financial reporting lends itself to 
keeping those with a financial stake in the company very up-to-date on changing 
developments. 
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Retired officers of a company do not belong on its board. It is enough to 
have independent outside directors looking over the shoulders of the manage-
ment, without the previous generation of management also doing so. Outsiders 
have less stake in defending the status quo than do the retirees who may have 
created existing conditions. 
There are advantages in retired corporate officers drawing on their experience 
by serving as directors of other companies, so long as they are not competitors 
of or suppliers to the company from which they have retired. Although much 
is made of the notion of having a majority of outsiders on the board, the results 
depend on who the outsiders are. The CEO of another major corporation is 
likely to have far more inherent authority than a faculty member at a local 
university. Even in that situation, however, much depends on the personality 
and knowledge of the individual. 
Opinions differ sharply on whether the CEO should also serve as chairman 
of the board. The chairman should be an outside director in order to assure 
the independence of the board. But given the varying circumstances of indi-
vidual firms, I would not codify that practice into law. It would be helpful if 
the presiding officer had relevant prior experience-a recently retired CEO of 
another firm or of a large non-profit institution, for example. Probably the 
chairman should serve for a fixed non-renewable term, thus avoiding the 
possibility of the development of an entrenched competitor to the CEO while 
maintaining his or her independence. 
In addition to the CEO, other senior members of the management can be 
useful board members. For example, one or more vice-chairmen would be 
appropriate. Usually, these are people of considerable experience who hold 
primarily a counselor or advisory relationship to the CEO, and who served 
in major operating positions earlier in their careers. Their presence on the board 
does not give rise to the kind of problems that occur when operating officials 
are made board members-when they in effect participate in reviewing their 
own operations and those of their colleagues. Because of the crucial relation-
ship of financial reporting to the monitoring function, the chief financial offi-
cer probably should also be a board member. None of these inside directors 
can be expected to differ frequently with the CEO, thus emphasizing the need 
for a substantial representation of outside, independent directors. 
The board chairmanship should be a private role while the CEO represents 
the firm to the public. Only the CEO and his subordinates can truly represent 
the firm in public arenas since they bear the responsibility and possess the 
authority to conduct the business of the company. Consistent with these points, 
the board chairman should write a message to the shareholders to be included 
in the annual report. To be useful, such a statement should not be perfunc-
tory, but truly a report on the stewardship of the board of directors. This would 
be in addition to the customary CEO letter to shareholders. 
For this approach to be successful requires a high degree of good will on 
the part of both outside directors and corporate officers. As most boards now 
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function, an excess of independence can make a board member's position un-
comfortable. But no management can be expected to function saddled with 
board members whose persistent position appears to be that of adversaries. 10 
The indispensable factor in ensuring an effective board is that directors and 
management be committed, each in its own long-term self-interest, to making 
the board work. As Harold M. Williams has pointed out, "No legislation or 
rule can substitute for that commitment. " 11 A great deal of effort and discre-
tion is required on the part of outside directors to carry on an active and con-
structive role that is simultaneously probing and supportive. 
The points just made for board service apply with equal force to committee 
work. Compared to plenary board meetings, directors are more likely to take 
the initiative in committees. 12 Some institutional protections of the inde-
pendence of board committees are necessary and are now often in place. 
Specifically, the audit committee should consist entirely of independent out-
side directors-this is already a requirement for corporations listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. The compensation committee-which passes on the pay 
and fringe benefits of top management-should be similarly constituted. Also, 
the nominating committee-with a key role in selecting directors and senior 
executives-should be comprised of independent outside members. 
In contrast, the finance and public policy committees can benefit from a 
balance between insiders and outsiders. The management directors bring a 
special institutional knowledge, while the outside directors hopefully operate 
with a wider framework. Another reason for the "mixed" finance committee 
is that it provides a built-in opportunity to balance the pressures for dividends 
and retained earnings. Often many shareholders emphasize the short-run 
benefits of increased income, while management is more concerned about 
investing in the company's future growth. Also, the officers may simply find 
it easier or at least more satisfactory to use retained earnings rather than going 
to the credit markets. For the typical business firm, this is not an either-or 
choice, but a case of balancing two important and basic considerations. 
CEOs and other busy professionals will have to ration more carefully the 
number of boards on which they serve than is now the prevailing practice-
and boards should be more selective in their new appointments. Outside direc-
tors should be truly independent. They should not also simultaneously be paid 
consultants or advisers to the management. Moreover, they should not have 
their own ax to grind, be it supporting the local community or advocating more 
generous treatment of corporate executives generally. Outside directors need 
to bear in mind that, in a very special way, the future of the corporation is 
in their hands-so long as they serve the desires of the shareholders. 
Management consultant Arch Patton has an intriguing suggestion for reduc-
ing the "coziness" between CEOs who serve on each others' boards: 
Since their own companies pay them rather well and they take time off 
from their own businesses to help someone else, it seems to me that they 
should turn over any remuneration as outside directors to their companies. 13 
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The subject of Board turnover is often a painful matter. A directorship is 
not a type of civil service appointment. It should not become a sinecure, but 
it is not easy to dislodge a long-term director. There are important benefits 
to a company from having members whose longevity provides a wealth of 
background and experience with the company-sometimes in excess of that 
of the current top management. Yet, there is danger that long-time directors 
become so accustomed to the existing way of doing business that they viscerally 
oppose innovation on the oldest bureaucratic grounds: "We have never done 
it that way." Also, the needs of a company may change-with shifts in its 
markets, product line, regulatory status, and external environment. 
John Gardner suggests that board members be limited in their length of 
service, perhaps to two nonconsecutive five-year terms. The point of the com-
pulsory turnover is not to deal with the age factor, although it would be less 
likely to arise. Rather, it would be a way of bringing different people with fresh 
approaches to the proceedings in the boardroom. 14 At present, the average 
retirement age for outside directors is 70 and that for inside directors is 68. 15 
In representing the interests of the shareholders, directors need to exercise 
especial discretion and independence in dealing with unsolicited tender offers. 
The hostile tender often presents a situation in which the interests of the 
management of the target company may diverge from those of the shareholders. 
Common sense tells us that the usual reaction of existing management is to 
oppose the efforts of outsiders to take over control of "their" company. Such 
action may deprive shareholders of the opportunity to sell their stock at a 
premium above the current market value. Leech and Mundheim warn that direc-
tors may be personally liable under certain circumstances if they acquiesce in 
improper attacks on tender offers. 16 The much maligned "golden parachutes" 
(financially protecting senior officers from the adverse effects of a takeover) 
can be a way of dealing with this problem. However, these special provisions 
also tend to insulate management from the day-to-day concern over shareholder 
interests. 17 
There are important reasons, however, for resisting some takeover efforts. 
For example, the price offered, even though at a premium above market, may 
be inadequate. Resistance may result in a higher offer, either from the same 
source or from another. Also, the offerer may be considered a potential looter 
or someone who would mismanage the company. It is also possible that the 
tender price is attractive only in the light of a temporarily depressed stock 
market. 
Moreover, the offer may be of a coercive (i.e., two-tiered) nature. That is, 
only a portion of the company's stock would be purchased at a high price. 
Subsequent sellers would receive much lower amounts. Often large institutional 
investors sell on the first "tier, " while small stockholders wind up getting much 
lower prices on the second "tier" of sales. 
It is difficult for outside directors to monitor management decisions, to fight 
tender offers, and to make informed decisions. Leech and Mundheim have pro-
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posed that corporate boards should establish special committees of outside 
directors whose major function would be to determine whether continuation 
of the opposition to a given tender offer makes sense. They caution that such 
a committee should avoid being drawn into any separate negotiations with the 
offerer. 18 
The federal government should avoid increasing its role in corporate 
takeovers or other aspects of corporate governance. The long and intriguing 
history of government involvement in making business decisions does not pro-
vide an inspiring basis for expanding the role of the federal government in cor-
porate governance. Whether that intervention is made by the judicial, legislative, 
or executive branch, government regulation often does more harm than good. 19 
In recent years, we have painfully and repeatedly learned about "govern-
ment failure. " That is, the presence of some shortcoming in the private business 
system (often called "market failure") is not sufficient cause for government 
intervention. Study after study shows that much government regulation fre-
quently fails to meet the most elementary benefit-cost test. 
Moreover, another lesson from recent economic history is that government 
intervention begets more government intervention. In the present situation, 
for example, if government should limit defensive maneuvers by company 
managements, that would tilt the balance of power in takeover battles. Invar-
iably, it would lead to pleas to restrict offensive actions of the corporate raiders 
(and vice versa). 
Surely it is legitimate for well-financed groups of investors to attempt hostile 
takeovers of private companies. So, too, resistance by the target company's 
board of directors may be perfectly proper. To ascribe the public interest to 
just one side of the controversy is to ignore the fundamental role of competi-
tion in the marketplace. 
No compelling case has yet been made for government intervention in 
corporate takeover battles-on behalf of either side. 
The visceral instinct of many is to urge the federal government to "do 
something." But no compelling case has yet been made for government inter-
vention in corporate takeover battles-on behalf of either side. Given the many 
instances of costly and counterproductive government intervention, the best 
advice to Congress and to the regulators may be: "Don't do something foolish. " 
B. A Look to the Future 
A growing array of external forces impinges on the contemporary corpora-
tion. Some of these factors are financial and economic, focusing on the tradi-
tional functions of business enterprise. Others are social and political, deal-
ing with business responses to other issues. Together, these influences will likely 
produce significant further changes in the composition of corporate boards 
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of directors and in conduct in the boardroom. The following five trends are 
highlighted on the basis of an extrapolation of recent developments, 20 tempered 
by the knowledge that inevitably there will be feedback effects which we do 
not now foresee. 
I. The board of directors is becoming a more important center of corporate 
power. Recent changes in the structure of boards-more outside directors and 
stronger committees-will, with the inevitable lag, result in substantive changes 
in the decision-making process. External pressures are forcing the board to focus 
more fully on the fundamental reason for its existence: to represent the interests 
of the owners of the enterprise. As Korn and Ferry report from their surveys 
of corporate boards, "Increasingly, directors are becoming less bashful and 
more assertive. " 21 
2. The board is becoming more of a peer group than it has been in the past. 
It is moving in the direction of being a collegial body of equals. The trend 
toward more work is also resulting in higher compensation which, in turn, re-
inforces the desire of outside directors to devote more time to corporate 
matters. Their outlook can be longer-term than that of the management, as 
they have little financial stake in the year-to-year fluctuations of the company's 
sales and earnings. 
3. As they gain more experience in their emerging role, the new breed of direc-
tors will be striking a better balance between self-interest and indifference than 
the traditional board. But it will be the rare board that attains that happy middle 
position easily or for an extended period of time. The most satisfactory rela-
tionship between conscientious directors and strong, effective company 
managers will border on "creative·tension." 
4. The larger boards will be shrinking in size in order to adapt to their emerg-
ing role. Those directors who serve on too many boards or whose available 
time is limited will resign. 22 Outside directors will tend to be more indepen-
dent of the management than is often the case today. The resultant more 
cohesive group will require and receive an improved flow of information on 
company activities as well as developing problems. That will help them carry 
out their function of serving as surrogates for the shareholders. 
5. The growing role of board members is increasing their liability and 
accountability for the way they carry out their duties. That legal liability, 
ultimately, will serve as a check on the expansion of board functions, as well 
as on its size. But, the concern with legal and financial liability for board actions 
also will be a continuing incentive for directors to probe more deeply into com-
pany plans and operations. 
Looking ahead, researchers and practitioners alike in the 21st Century will 
probably still be speculating about the needed changes in the roles and activi-
ties of corporate directors. Fundamentally, that will reflect the fact that the 
corporation is a continually evolving institution in the American economy and, 
as external requirements change, key elements such as the board of directors 
continue to adapt and modify their actions. All this helps to explain the basic 
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strength and resiliency-as well as long-term unpredictability-of private enter-
prise institutions in the United States.23 
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